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environmental agreements
Abstract
While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions
proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more
e⁄ective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in e⁄ectiveness
of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global
agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive e⁄ect of an increase in
adaptation￿ s e⁄ectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global
cooperation over GHGs emissions.
JEL Classi￿cations: Q54, Q59
Keywords: adaptation, climate change, international environmental agreements, trans-
boundary pollution.
21 Introduction
Countries around the world are currently actively pursuing di⁄erent means of tackling climate
change. First, countries are attempting to mitigate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
through international negotiations. Second, countries are undertaking adaptive measures to
reduce the negative e⁄ects of climate change. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
how the success of the ￿rst, in fact, depends on the latter. That is, how does adaptation af-
fect individual countries￿incentives to participate in international environmental agreements
(IEAs) that limit GHGs emissions?
An individual country￿ s emission of GHGs causes a negative externality on other coun-
tries by exacerbating climate change. A country choosing its emission level non-cooperatively
(i.e. maximizing its individual welfare) would, therefore, over-pollute relative to the cooper-
ative outcome (where each country maximizes joint welfare of all countries when choosing its
emission level). Such behavior is referred to in the literature as "free-riding". International
cooperation to reduce emissions has, thus, been a natural approach to alleviating climate
change. However, some have argued that mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions cannot be
the only policy response to climate change because due to the inertia of the climate sys-
tem, even drastic emission reduction targets today would not be su¢ cient to slow down
global climate change. This has resulted, in recent years, in countries increasingly under-
taking adaptive measures to reduce the potential damage caused by climate change induced
catastrophes such as ￿ oods. A recent article in The Economist, entitled "How to live with
climate change: It won￿ t be stopped, but its e⁄ects can be made less bad", captures the
ongoing developments as follows: "... in the wake of the Copenhagen summit, there is a
growing acceptance that the e⁄ort to avert serious climate change has run out of steam...
Acceptance, however, does not mean inaction. Since the beginning of time, creatures have
adapted to changes in their environment..."1
The term "adaptation", within this context, refers to adjustments in ecological, social or
1See The Economist print edition, November 27, 2010.
3economic systems for reducing potential damage from climate change (Parry et al, 2007).
It is loosely de￿ned to cover a wide range of measures including the building of dykes or
levees, which protects a coastal region repeatedly from an increasing onset of ￿ oods caused
by climate change, the changing of crop types, facilitating early storm warning or disaster
response and recovery cost.2 Although each country has a private incentive to invest in the
deployment of adaptive measures, there are a number of international and concerted initia-
tives aimed at improving the e⁄ectiveness of adaptation. The increased e⁄ectiveness may
be in the form of improved disaster response measures: e.g., more e¢ cient ￿ ood evacuation
schemes.3 It can also be in the form of more e¢ cient proactive disaster management mea-
sures, including prevention measures such as early warning measures and developing meth-
ods for accurate risk assessments,4 education campaigns, improvement of irrigation facilities
in rural areas, more e¢ cient ￿ ood prevention mechanisms ranging from shore protection
(building levees) and terracing in rural areas5 to adaptation of production, and sound urban
planning.6 Given the wide range of adaptation activities undertaken by countries, how can
2See http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/defusing-disaster-en.pdf
3The World Bank has implemented post-disaster reconstruction projects in Argentina (e.g. The Argentina
Flood Rehabilitation Project), Brazil (e.g. The Rio Flood Reconstruction Prevention Project), Mexico and
India (e.g. Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Program). See Ranghieri (2010) for further
details.
4Example of early warning programs include The Early Warning System for Hydrogeologi-
cal Risk Monitoring and Forecast of Calabria Region (Italy) and the National Forecast Center
(Cuba). The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction includes The Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) monitoring tools for disaster risk reduction in the Europe region
(http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/hfamonitoring/).
The EU has its own program MOVE: Methods for the Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in Eu-
rope. The UFZ ￿CapHaz-Net, RiskMap & ConHaz: Natural Hazards Management Projects in Germany
has similar objectives. There also exists the Capacity Building Program through DIANE-CM (Decentralised
Integrated Analysis and Enhancement of Awareness through Collaborative Modelling and Management of
Flood Risk) which aims to Integrate, Consolidate and Disseminate European Flood Risk Management Re-
search.
5Examples include proactive projects such as Coastal environmental preservation - mangrove planting:
Vietnam Red Cross, Focus on response preparedness: Bangladesh Red Crescent Society and FREEMAN:
Flood REsilience Enhancement and MANagement: a pilot study in Flanders, Germany and Italy.
6At the Mayors￿Summit in Copenhagen (December 2009), the Mayors￿Task Force on Urban Poverty
and Climate Change was formed and is actively helping cities like Dar es Salaam, Jakarta, Mexico City and
Sao Paulo (see Ranghieri, 2010). National and regional governments also have set up several institutes to
prevent disasters such as the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute, and the ENSURE Program of the EU
for enhancing resilience of communities and territories facing natural hazards.
4the "e⁄ectiveness" of adaptation be measured? The World Resources Institute has proposed
the "Bellagio framework for adaptation assessment and prioritization" for this purpose.7 It
is a standardized and comprehensive measure of adaptation e⁄ectiveness that takes into ac-
count planning, management and services delivery functions of the system of adaptation of
a country. These criteria include how broadly the system is applicable, how ￿ exible it is
to accommodate national circumstances, how straightforward it is to implement, its user-
friendliness and compatibility with other tools, frameworks, and decision criteria. Based on
these criteria, countries may be ranked on the e⁄ectiveness of their adaptation e⁄orts.
This paper asks whether an increase in the e⁄ectiveness of such adaptive measures reduces
countries￿free-riding incentives and increases the likelihood of sustaining a self-enforcing
international environmental agreement over emissions.
This question gains importance in light of the persistent failure of countries to reach
binding commitments on emission targets, as embodied at the UN Climate Conferences held
in Kyoto in 1997 and Copenhagen in 2009, and the billions of dollars that governments are
setting aside for developing more e⁄ective adaptive measures to safeguard against imminent
damage from climate change. Since 1980, the World Bank has approved more than 500 op-
erations related to disaster management, amounting to more than US$40 billion. Estimates
provided by international organizations of ￿nancial resources needed in developing countries
for adaptation include: $10 to $40 billion annually (World Bank, 2007), $50 billion annually
(Oxfam International, 2007), $86 billion annually by 2015 (UNDP, 2007), $46 to $171 billion
annually by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2007). Moreover, there exist several adaptation funds run by
the UNFCCC, World Bank and European Commission that have already contributed in the
millions towards adaptation.8
7This document is available at http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/bellagio_framework_for_adaptation.pdf
8According to Le Goulven (2008), existing adaptation funds inlcude the following. The UNFCCC pledged
$50 million through the SPA (Strategic Priority ￿Piloting an Operational Approach to Adaptation￿ ) in 2001
of which $28 million had been committed and $14.8 million disbursed by 2008. The UNFCCC pledged
$165 million through the LDCF (Least Developed Countries Fund) in 2001 of which $59 million had been
committed and $9.8 million spent by 2008. The UNFCCC pledged $65 million through the SCCF (Special
Climate Change Fund) in 2001 of which $9 million had been committed and $1.4 million spent by 2008.
5The existing literature on adaptation can be broadly categorized into two streams. The
￿rst provides a description of the trade-o⁄ facing countries when deciding how to allocate
resources between mitigating GHG emissions and adapting to climate change (see for ex-
ample, Auerswald, Konrad and Thum, 2011; Buob and Stephan, 2011; Ingham, Ma, and
Ulph, 2005; Tol, 2005). The second stream explicitly incorporates adaptation in integrated
assessment models to analyze the interaction between mitigation and adaptation (see for
example Bosello, Carraro and de Cian, 2011; De Bruin, Dellink, and Tol, 2009). Other
integrated assessment models such as RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) implicitly capture
adaptation by incorporating the costs of adaptation in the regional damage function. For
a recent survey of the literature on the economics of adaptation, please refer to Agrawala
et al (2011). But none of these papers allow for coalition formation amongst the countries
and therefore, do not analyze the impact of adaptation on the incentives to participate in
international environmental agreements.
This paper sets up a game theoretic framework, which incorporates both adaptation
and participation in a global agreement on emission reduction as strategies available to
individual countries dealing with climate change. We assume that the e⁄ect of adaptation
is local whereas the damage caused by emissions is global, in line with real examples of
adaptive measures currently being undertaken by di⁄erent countries.
We show that more e⁄ective adaptation reduces the incentive of a coalition member to
free-ride and leave the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition that includes all countries. This
result is shown to hold for all coalition sizes except for a coalition of size two.9 Moreover, we
show that this positive impact of increased e⁄ectiveness of adaptation can be accompanied
by an increase in the gains from cooperation over the control of emissions. The incentive of
a coalition member to leave a coalition corresponds to the criterion of internal stability of a
Also in 2001, the Kyoto Protocol set up an Adaptation Fund which pledged $160-950 million by 2012. In
2008, the World Bank￿ s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience under the Strategic Climate Fund pledged
$500 million. In 2007, the European Commission pledged EUR 50 million under the Global Climate Change
Alliance and the German Ministry of the Environment pledged EUR 60 million.
9In the case of a coalition of two members, the impact of a more e⁄ective adaptation on free riding
incentives of an individual country to abandon the coalition is ambiguous.
6coalition, used in D￿ Aspremont et al. (1983) in a cartel formation game and extensively used
in the IEA literature (for a comprehensive analytical treatment of the IEA formation game
see for example, Barrett, 1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Rubio and Ulph, 2006).10
This literature examines stable coalition sizes that are internally and externally stable, that
is, coalitions where no insider has an incentive to leave a coalition and no outsider wishes
to join the coalition. In general, it is shown that stable coalitions are small and that large
coalitions are stable only when the gains from a large coalition are small. Our work is
motivated by the question of whether a more e⁄ective adaptation can help achieve large
coalitions. This is why our primary focus is on the analysis of the grand coalition and its
internal stability. An important result that we obtain is that a more e⁄ective adaptation
can simultaneously reduce incentives of a coalition member to leave the grand coalition
and increase the gains from cooperation over the control of emissions. This is a rather
optimistic result about the impact of having more e⁄ective adaptation, especially when
compared to the existing literature, which concludes that incentives to free-ride are small (or
non-existent) only when the gains from cooperation are negligible (see for example, Barrett,
1994; de Zeeuw, 2008). Thus, adaptation, rather than merely being a substitute for the
failed attempts at negotiating an IEA, as suggested currently in The Economist (November
2010) and other media outlets, may actually foster international cooperation on mitigating
emissions of GHGs.11
A recent strand of the IEA literature has analyzed the role that breakthrough technologies
can play in dealing with climate change. Barrett (2006) has shown that unless technology
10A recent strand of the literature examines the ￿ farsighted￿stability criterion that allows for a more
sophisticated behavior of players. In deciding whether to join or leave a coalition a player considers the
implication of her decision on other players￿ s decision to leave or stay in a coalition. (see e.g. Diamantoudi
and Sartzetakis, 2002; de Zeeuw, 2008; Osmani and Tol, 2009). Another approach to model the dynamic
aspect of coalition formation has been to allow for an evolutionary process to determine which countries join
and/or leave the coaliton over time (see e.g. Breton, Sbragia and Zaccour, 2010).
11Indeed, it seems that countries are realizing the importance of including adaptation in inter-
national negotiations, given the new "Cancun Adaptation Fund" that has been established at the
COP16 Meetings held at Cancun in December 2010. (UNFCCC Press Release, 11 December 2011,
http://unfccc.int/￿les/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/
pr_20101211_cop16_closing.pdf)
7adoption involves increasing returns, a treaty on the development and adoption of break-
through technologies will su⁄er from the same strong free-riding incentives that prevail in
a treaty over the abatement of emissions. This pessimistic result can be reversed if, for
example, the cost of adoption of a breakthrough technology can be decreasing with the level
of R&D (see Hoel and de Zeeuw, 2010) or if global investment in R&D is not a perfect
public good, and there are imperfect and asymmetric degrees of R&D spillovers between
coalition members and non-members (see El-Sayed and Rubio, 2011). These papers focus
on international cooperation on R&D and/or development and adoption of ￿ breakthrough
technologies￿ . In this paper, we abstract from the development and the adoption phase of
the technology and our focus is on international cooperation on emissions. We consider an
exogenous technological innovation that is available and adopted by all countries (whether
signatories of an IEA or not) and that reduce the cost to adapt to climate change, i.e.,
improves the e⁄ectiveness of the adaptation e⁄orts to reduce the harm caused by climate
change12. In our model, each country chooses a level of emissions and a level of adaptation
e⁄ort. We assess how such increase in adaptation e⁄ectiveness impacts the incentive of a
country to participate in an IEA over emissions. As in Tulkens and van Steenberghe (2009)
we explicitly include adaptation costs in the total environmental cost function and charac-
terize the cost-minimizing balance between ￿ mitigation, adaptation and su⁄ering￿ . However,
they do not consider the issue of the incentive to participate in an IEA.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilib-
rium of the model. Section 4 presents the e⁄ects of adaptation on the free-riding incentives.
Section 5 provides a robustness check of the main results under alternative formulations.
Section 6 concludes.
12The increase in ￿ e⁄ectiveness￿may include an ￿ incremental￿improvement of an existing adaptation tech-
nique or measure.
82 The Model
Let N = f1;:::;ng denote the set of all countries, with n ￿ 3. A by-product of the consump-
tion and production activities of each country is the emission of a global pollutant. Country
i emits ei ￿ 0 units of the pollutant with the aggregate emissions denoted by E =
Pn
i=1 ei.
Each country is also allowed to spend resources on adapting to the damage from pollution.
The level of adaptation chosen by country i is given by ai; and, in line with reality, is assumed
to reduce the e⁄ects of pollution for country i only:
Let B (ei) represent the bene￿t to country i from its own emissions as follows:







with ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0: We have B0 (ei) > 0 and B00 (ei) < 0 for all ei < ￿ e ￿ ￿
￿ :





2 ￿ ￿aiE (2)
with ! > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0:13 The damage function, as given by (2); captures two features
pertaining to climate change. First, the damage is convex in global emissions. Second, the
marginal damage from emissions is decreasing in the level of adaptation. From (2); the
marginal damage from emissions is given by
@D(E;ai)
@E = !E ￿ ￿ai; which is decreasing in ￿
and positive for ai < ￿ a ￿ !E
￿ : We also have that
@D(E;ai)
@ai = ￿￿E < 0; that is, pollution






13The tradeo⁄, in our damage function, between the levels of emission, E; and adaptation, ai; is similar
to that in the literature on multiple pollutants in the context of climate change, where some pollutants such
as CO2 increase global warming and others such as SO2 have a cooling e⁄ect (see, for example, Legras and
Zaccour, 2011).
14In our model, the net cost of adaptation is given by the cost function, C (ai); less the bene￿t from
adaptation in terms of reduced damage, ￿aiE: Thus, our net cost of adaptation is decreasing in the global
emission level, E; for all ￿ > 0. This is analogous to the way in which cost of R&D has been modeled
by Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) within the context of international cooperation on the development of clean
9Henceforth in the paper, we distinguish between the "level" of adaptation, as denoted
by ai, and the "e⁄ectiveness" of adaptation, as denoted by ￿. Here a high (low) ￿ refers
to those adaptive measures that lead to a large (small) reduction in the marginal damage
of emissions. Examples of more e⁄ective adaptation measures being implemented include
the following. Consider ￿shing villages in Pondicherry (India). A few years ago a computer
linked to the internet has been set up in these villages. This provides villagers access to
the latest weather reports, tailored to match the villages￿own stretch of coast. This is then
broadcast to the village over a loudspeaker system. Because of this system villagers have
reported that the average number of ￿shermen lost at sea annually has dropped from about
six to zero.15 Another example of increased e⁄ectiveness of adaptive measure are the levees
in New Orleans. According to the US Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) repaired and restored 220 miles of ￿ oodwalls and levees since
September 2005, such that the New Orleans hurricane protection system is more e⁄ective
than it was when Katrina hit. Levees and ￿ ood walls have been armored to protect against
erosion from possible overtopping in several areas, and pumping stations are being storm
proofed. Floodgates have been added at the outfall canals to protect against storm surge
and a tree cutting program on existing levees for protection is ongoing. The Corps continues
to construct stronger protection for New Orleans by engineering, constructing and improving
storm and ￿ ood protection infrastructure to a 100-year protection level. This work includes
higher levees, stronger ￿ oodwalls and greater interior drainage capacity.16






where c > 0: That is, the cost of adaptation is strictly convex and increasing in ai:
Our modeling of adaptation in (2) and (3) is in line with Tulkens and van Steenberghe
technologies, where the cost of R&D is decreasing in the level of R&D.
15For further details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/2932758.stm
16See http://www.dhs.gov/xfoia/archives/gc_1157649340100.shtm for further details.
10(2009) who consider the full cost minimization problem faced by countries in the presence
of both mitigation and adaptation.
Social welfare of each country is assumed to be given by the following:
w(E;ai) ￿ B (ei) ￿ D(E;ai) ￿ C(ai) (4)
where B (ei); D(E;ai) and C(ai) are given by (1); (2); and (3) respectively.
In the non-cooperative case, the objective of each country￿ s government is to simulta-
neously choose ei and ai that maximize its own welfare taking as given the emissions and




where w(E;ai) is given by (4):
In the fully cooperative case, the countries simultaneously choose ei and ai that maximize





Assumption 1: We have that ! > ! ￿ ￿2
c :
Assumption 1 ensures that, in the non-cooperative equilibrium and the fully cooperative
equilibrium, the marginal bene￿t to each country from emissions is non-negative, that is,




Consider the scenario where the countries decide to form an international environmental
agreement. More speci￿cally, let S ￿ N countries sign an agreement while NnS do not.
11We denote the size of coalition S by s and the total emission generated by the coalition by
Es = ses, where es is the emission of a representative signatory. Similarly, Ens = (n￿s)ens is
the total emissions generated by the complement of the coalition with ens being the emissions
generated by a representative non-signatory. The sum of the emissions of the signatory and
non-signatory countries, that is global emissions, is given by E = Es + Ens:
We assume that the non-signatories and signatories simultaneously choose their best
response functions. The coalition acts as a single player in the game once a coalition has
been formed.












￿ + ! ￿ ￿2
c
; i 2 NnS;k 2 S (7)




















￿ ; i 2 S and k 2 S (9)





which implies that each country￿ s adaptation level increases in total emissions.

























































< ￿ e (14)
We note that e￿
ns > 0 for all ￿ ￿ 0:
Assumption 2: We have that ! < ￿ ! ￿ ! +
￿
(n￿s)(s￿1):
Assumption 2 ensures that e￿
s > 0; as shown by (14):









We note that, under Assumption 1, E￿ is always positive.










where E￿ is given by (15): Notice that in equilibrium, the non-signatory and signatory
countries each choose the same level of adaptation, which is less than ￿ a under Assumption
1. This is consistent with the fact that the e⁄ect of adaptation is purely local. Thus, the
13equilibrium level is the same for each country, regardless of whether the country is maximizing
its individual welfare or the joint welfare of all signatories.
The equilibrium welfare levels of each signatory and non-signatory are reported in the
Appendix A.
4 Free-riding and more e⁄ective adaptation
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Alternatively, ￿ can be interpreted as the incentive of an individual country, member of
a coalition of size s, to free-ride and leave that coalition. In this section, we focus on the
incentive of an individual country to free-ride and leave the grand coalition (i.e. s = n)
and determine how the presence of adaptation a⁄ects this free-riding incentive. Note that
Assumption 2 is always satis￿ed when s = n. We postpone the analysis of cases where s < n;
to the following section.
We now study the impact of a change in ￿ on ￿(n), for a given !. We note that the larger
is ￿; the smaller the incentive of a coalition member to free-ride and leave the coalition. In





: Note that from Assumption 1 we
14have X > 0.
Proposition 1: The incentive of a coalition member to free-ride and leave the grand coali-






(z3X3 + z2X2 + z1X + z0)(1 ￿ n)Xn2￿2
(￿ + Xn2)
3 (2X + Xn + ￿ + Xn(n ￿ 3))
3
where z1; z2 and z3, after algebraic manipulation, can be written as follows:
z1 = 3(n(n ￿ 1)(n ￿ 2) ￿ 2)￿
2 (18)
z2 = (n(n ￿ 2)(3n(n(n ￿ 1) + 2) ￿ 4) ￿ 4)￿ (19)
z3 = n
2 (n(n(n(n(n ￿ 3) + 6) ￿ 10) + 8) ￿ 4): (20)




This, together with the fact that X is decreasing in ￿; yields Proposition 1.￿
Why does more e⁄ective adaptation reduce free-riding incentives? From (7) and (9); it
follows that the more e⁄ective is adaptation at reducing marginal damage from emissions,
the ￿ atter the best response function of each country in terms of emissions. This reduces
the level of global emissions in the non-cooperative equilibrium, making it less costly to
cooperate on emission strategies. The best response functions are ￿ atter because, when
other countries increase emissions, each individual country may, instead of reducing its own
emissions, decrease its own damage by increasing adaptation. This explains why the higher
the e⁄ectiveness of adaptation the lower the free-riding incentives of individual countries in
this transboundary pollution game.
15Next, we study how the aggregate gains from cooperation change with ￿: Let G denote











2(￿ + (n ￿ s + s2)X)
2 (￿ + nX)
2 ￿
with ￿ = n(s ￿ 1)(s ￿ n)X2 + ￿n(2n ￿ 3s + s2)X ￿ ￿
2 (s ￿ 2n + 1).
In the case of the grand coalition s = n we have the following.
Proposition 2: There exists ￿ n such that for n > ￿ n, we have that a marginal increase of
adaptation e⁄ectiveness results in an increase of the welfare gains from forming the grand
coalition (i.e., of size s = n) as compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The value of ￿ n depends on ￿;! and c and may well be smaller than 3. This happens for
example when ￿ is small enough. More precisely, we have the following corollary.













￿, then for all n ￿ 3, a marginal increase
in adaptation e⁄ectiveness results in an increase in the gains from the formation of the grand
coalition.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Propositions 1 and 2 give a rather optimistic message. An increase in adaptation e⁄ec-
tiveness can result in a decrease of individual countries￿incentive to free-ride on a global
agreement and an increase of the gains from a global agreement. In the existing literature
on IEA formation, it has been shown that incentives to free-ride are small (or non-existent)
only when the gains from cooperation are negligible.17
Why do the gains from cooperation increase with the e⁄ectiveness of adaptation? Since
17See for example Barrett (1994) who highlights the trade-o⁄ between having large stable IEAs with little
aggregate welfare improvements upon the non-cooperative outcome versus having small stable IEAs with
large improvements upon the non-cooperative outcome.
16the cost of adaptation is convex in the level of adaptation, failing to reach a cooperative
equilibrium on emissions increases the cost to each individual country through this channel.
This explains why the gains from cooperation increase as more adaptation is undertaken.
This, together with the fact that more adaptation is undertaken in equilibrium the more
e⁄ective is adaptation, explains Proposition 2.
5 Discussion
The main results of this paper, as given by Propositions 1 and 2, were shown for the grand
coalition. In this section, we examine the case of a coalition of countries of size s < n. It is




for all n ￿ 3 and s 2 f3;::;ng. The approach to prove this result is similar to the case where
s = n: To economize on space, we omit the details of the proof. The case where s = 2 needs
a special treatment which is provided later. For now, we proceed with analyzing the gains
from cooperation for n ￿ 3 and s 2 f3;::;ng.
The algebraic expressions for the impact of a change in adaptation e⁄ectiveness on the
gains from cooperation are too cumbersome to derive analytical results. We, therefore,
proceed by ￿xing the number of countries n to 10 and consider coalitions of size s 2 f3;::;9g:
For n = 10; it can be shown that the sign of @G
@￿ is the same as the sign of the expression
P where

























2 ￿ 90s + 600
￿
+ 38 ￿ 2s
17Moreover, for Assumption 2 to hold, we must have X < ￿ X ￿
￿
(n￿s)(s￿1) which in the case of
n = 10 becomes X <
￿




di⁄erent values of s between 3 and 9.
Table 1: Upper bound of X as s varies

















In Figure 1, we plot P (s;:) for s 2 f3;::9g with X < ￿ X.
Figure 1: P (s;:) as a function of
X
￿























other curves correspond to the cases of s = 4;::;8.





@￿ > 0 that is an increase in adaptation e⁄ectiveness increases the
gains from the formation of a coalition. This is also true for s = 9 when X does not exceed
a certain threshold. A similar conclusion can be reached if we use other values of n instead
18of 10.
For completeness, we provide the results for a coalition member to leave a coalition of
size s = 2:
Proposition 3: For s = 2; there exists ^ ￿ such that
(i) for ￿ < ^ ￿; the incentive to free-ride decreases as ￿ increases, that is,
@￿(2)
@￿ > 0:
(ii) for ￿ > ^ ￿; there exists ^ n > 2 such that
@￿(2)
@￿ < (>)0 for all n < (>)^ n.
Proof: See Appendix D.
For s = 2; the e⁄ect of increasing the e⁄ectiveness of adaptation depends on the initial
level of ￿. A marginal increase in the e⁄ectiveness of adaptive measures reduces the incentive
to free-ride when adaptive measures are relatively ine⁄ective (￿ < ^ ￿) or when the number of
countries is large enough (n > ^ n).
The approach to determine the sign of @G
@￿ for the case s 2 f3;::;9g can be repeated for
s = 2 and it yields @G
@￿ > 0 for s = 2:
6 Concluding Remarks
According to The Economist (27 November 2010), "the green pressure groups and politicians
who have driven the debate on climate change have often been loth to see attention paid
to adaptation, on the ground that the more people thought about it, the less motivated
they would be to push ahead with emissions reduction." We show that an increase in the
e⁄ectiveness of adaptation may result in a reduction of individual countries￿incentives to
free-ride on an IEA and an increase in the gains from forming the IEA. Therefore, the concern
of environmentalists with adaptation is partially mitigated.
The incentives to free-ride on an IEA may decrease in the presence of adaptation because
we show that the more e⁄ective is adaptation at reducing marginal damage from emissions,
the ￿ atter the best response functions of each country in terms of emissions. This reduces
the levels of global emissions in the non-cooperative equilibrium, making it less costly to
19cooperate on emission strategies. This is because, when other countries increase emissions,
each individual country may, instead of reducing its own emissions, decrease its own damage
by increasing adaptation. However, since the cost of adaptation is convex in the level of
adaptation, failing to reach a cooperative equilibrium on emissions increases the cost to
each individual country through this channel. This explains why the gains from cooperation
increase as more adaptation is undertaken.
In the current paper, we have analyzed the case of identical countries. In reality dif-
ferent regions are vulnerable to di⁄erent degrees to the e⁄ects of climate change and will
therefore undertake di⁄erent amounts/types of adaptation, for example, Southern Europe is
expected to be a⁄ected more than Northern Europe by climate change. Therefore, allowing
for asymmetries across countries would be a relevant extension.
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Appendix B: proof of Proposition 2












Xn3￿2 (n ￿ 1)
2 n3
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is monotonically decreasing in n and asymp-
totically converges to zero as n tends to in￿nity, completes the proof. ￿
Appendix C: Proof of Corollary






























along with conditions (i) and (ii) in the proof of Proposition 2, gives @G
@￿ > 0 for all n ￿ 3.￿
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2 + 12n + 16
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@X is the same as that of ￿. For convenience we use the notation ￿(n) to
speci￿cally analyze ￿ as a function of n. We ￿rst note that
￿
0 (n) = X
￿





is strictly decreasing in n; implying the following:
￿
0 (n) < ￿






25Therefore, the function ￿(n) is a strictly decreasing function of n. The evaluation of ￿(2)
gives the following:





It can be shown that there exists a unique ^ X > 0 such that ￿(2) < 0 for X > ^ X. Since
￿0 (n) < 0, we can state that there exists ^ X > 0 such that ￿(n) < 0 for X > ^ X or
@￿(2)
@X < 0
for X > ^ X. This, along with the fact that dX
d￿ < 0; completes the proof of (i). When
0 < X < ^ X we have ￿(2) > 0: Moreover, from Assumption 2 we have X <
￿







= ￿16(X + ￿)
3 < 0. This combined with ￿0 (n) < 0 proves (ii). ￿
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